USA v. Derrick Clemons by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-26-2012 
USA v. Derrick Clemons 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Derrick Clemons" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 385. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/385 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4454 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DERRICK STEVEN CLEMONS, 
          Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No 2-10-cr-00028-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
 
Argued on January 12, 2012 
 
Before:   McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 26, 2012) 
 
Elisa A. Long    
Lisa B. Freeland        [ARGUED] 
Office of Federal Public Defender 
1001 Liberty Avenue - #1500 
Pittsburgh, PA   15222 
          Counsel for Appellant 
 
Rebecca R. Haywood   [ARGUED] 
David J. Hickton 
Laura S. Irwin 
Office of the United States Attorney 
700 Grant Street - #4000 
Pittsburgh, PA   15129 
2 
 
          Counsel for Appellee 
 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge.   
 Derrick Clemons appeals his criminal conviction for possession with the intent to 
distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine.  He argues that the district court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress physical evidence, and in refusing to retroactively apply 
the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”), and that the court erred in 
denying counsel’s motion that the court disqualify itself from hearing his case.  For the 
reasons expressed below, we will affirm the denial of the motion to suppress and reverse 
the ruling on the FSA claim.  We need not consider the claim that the district judge 
abused his discretion in refusing to disqualify himself from the proceedings.   
I.  Background 
 Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we assume familiarity 
with the facts and procedural history.  We note only that prior to sentencing, Clemons 
asked the district court to retroactively apply the provisions of the FSA.  The court 
refused and sentenced Clemons to a sixty-month term of imprisonment followed by a 
five-year term of supervised release.  This appeal followed. 
II.  Discussion 
 A.  Motion to Suppress 
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 Clemons challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the 
evidence that was obtained through a strip search while he was in custody.  After he was 
arrested and taken into custody pursuant to an outstanding warrant, police observed a 
large bulge under his pants and they then conducted a visual inspection of his anal and 
genital areas.  They had information that, approximately five years earlier, Clemons had 
concealed controlled substances near his genitals.  The visual inspection revealed packets 
of suspected controlled substances between his penis and scrotum.  He now argues this 
was a strip search that was impermissible under the circumstances.  
 However, we need not reach the question of whether the police officers properly 
conducted a “strip search” under the Fourth Amendment.  Even if we assume arguendo  
that the search was unconstitutional, the evidence is admissible under the doctrine of 
inevitable discovery.  See United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 245 (3d Cir. 2011).  The 
inevitable discovery doctrine “considers what would have happened in the absence of the 
initial search.”  United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1140 (3d Cir. 1992).  Here, the 
large plastic baggie containing drugs secured to Clemons’ genital area would have been 
found during the routine intake process that is conducted before anyone is admitted to a 
detention facility.  
 As we noted at the outset, Clemons was arrested on an outstanding arrest warrant.  
He was clearly going to be placed in a detention facility of some kind pending a bail 
determination, and he does not argue otherwise.  It cannot seriously be argued that, under 
those circumstances, he would not have been placed in routine intake procedures that 
would have revealed that a baggie was secured between his penis and scrotum.   Common 
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sense suggests that that would have aroused his jailers’ curiosity and that they would 
have thought that just a wee bit peculiar—thus prompting further inquiry.  That inquiry 
would have certainly disclosed the drugs.  We therefore conclude that the district court 
did not err in admitting the drugs.  
 
 B.  Sentencing  
 To its credit, and in the finest tradition of representing the Government, the 
Assistant United States Attorney here has conceded that the district court erred by failing 
to conclude that the FSA was applicable in this case.  See Appellee Br. at 39.  Following 
the implementation of the FSA, the threshold for a mandatory sentence increased to 28 
grams of crack cocaine.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).  Because Clemons possessed 
8.5 grams of crack cocaine, the mandatory minimum no longer applied to him.  
The only dispute as to the FSA claim is whether this Court should remand for 
resentencing.  A sentence calculated using an erroneous Guidelines range generally 
requires reversal, unless the miscalculation is harmless.  United States v. Langford, 516 
F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008).  The Government contends that no remand is necessary 
because the failure to apply the FSA constituted harmless error.  We cannot agree. 
Unless we can conclude that the district court would have imposed the same 
sentence using the correct Guidelines range, we must remand for resentencing.  Id. at 
215-16.  The 60-month sentence imposed here falls within both the incorrect Guidelines 
range calculated using the mandatory minimum and the correct Guidelines range of 51 to 
63 months.  Thus, we cannot be sure that the district court would have imposed the same 
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sentence had it concluded that the FSA did apply.  Where, as here, a sentence falls within 
both an incorrectly calculated range, and a correctly calculated range, we have no way of 
knowing if the trial court would have imposed the same number of months if it had 
started with the correct Guideline calculation.  Accordingly, we will remand the case for 
resentencing. 
III.  Conclusion 
 For the reasons expressed above we will affirm the denial of the motion to 
suppress and vacate the sentence imposed.  The case is remanded for resentencing limited 
to one sentencing issue addressed herein.  See United States v. Salinas-Cortez, 660 F.3d 
695, 698 (3d Cir. 2001).  Inasmuch as the district court has agreed to allow a different 
judge to resentence if we ordered a remand, see United States v. Cunningham, No. 07-
0298 (W.D. Pa. Jul. 31, 2012) (order continuing disqualification), the case will be 
reassigned to a different judge for resentencing.  
